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JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN THE SUPREME COURT THE TROUBLING CASE OF JUSTICE STEPHEN BREYER

Monroe H. Freedman*
I. INTRODUCTION

There is increasing concern about the disregard of judicial
impartiality by members of the United States Supreme Court. A recent
case stimulating this concern is Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the
Districtof Columbia,' in which Justice Antonin Scalia declined to recuse
himself in a case involving Vice President Richard Cheney, his old friend
23
3
and duck-hunting companion.' As I have shown elsewhere, Scalia's
trip with Cheney violated recusal rules relating to (1) a close friendship
between a judge and a litigant, (2) the acceptance of something of value
by a judge from a litigant, and (3) the potential for ex parte
communications.4
Much more important, however, is the troubling history of Justice
Stephen Breyer. Breyer's own failures to recuse himself when required
to do so is of particular importance because he is chairing the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee.

. Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School. Author, MONROE FREEDMAN
& ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (3d ed. 2004). I am grateful to Lisa
Spar, Assistant Director for Reference and Instructional Services at the Hofstra Law
Library, for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem.).

2. See Monroe Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum in the

Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229 (2004). Scalia himself noted that editorials
in twenty of the thirty leading newspapers in the country urged his recusal in the case.
Cheney, 541 U.S. at 923 (quoting Motion to Recuse at 3-4); no newspaper in the country
argued against his recusal. Id.
3. See Freedman, supra note 2.
4. Id. at 230-32.
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Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist appointed this committee
on May 24, 2004, to "evaluate how the federal judicial system is dealing
with judicial misbehavior and disability.",5 Significantly, a plurality of
the cases of judicial misconduct in the Breyer Committee's study relates
to the failure of judges to recuse themselves when required to do so. 6
II. THE BREYER

COMMITTEE

The "intense criticism" of Justice Scalia's denial of a recusal motion
in the Cheney case was a principal reason for Rehnquist's appointment of
the Breyer Committee. 7 Critics included House Judiciary Committee
Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, R.-Wis., who told judicial leaders at
a private meeting that they were not adequately dealing with the issue of
recusal. 8 In response to these expressions of concern, Chief Justice
Rehnquist appointed the Breyer Committee to "look into it" and "see if
there are any real problems." 9
Unfortunately, Rehnquist himself was hostile to judicial
disqualification.' 0 For example, he had written to a group of senators that
criticism of Scalia's participation in the Cheney case had been "ill
considered."" Moreover, Rehnquist had perjured himself before
Congress in his confirmation hearings, and he had lied in a Supreme
Court memorandum opinion regarding his failure to recuse himself in
Laird v. Tatum. 12 More recently, in May of 2004, Rehnquist himself was
criticized for flying on a corporate jet owned by an Ohio power plant that
had dozens of cases in federal court. 13
5.

THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF
app. A at 131 [hereinafter JCDA STUDY COMM.].

1980 - A

REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE

6. See id.
at 25.
7. Gina Holland, Rehnquist OrdersStudy After Scalia Flap, SALON 1, May 25, 2004,

http://dir.salon.com/story/news/wire/2004/O5/25/ethics/index.html (last visited Sept. 1,
2006). See also Freedman, supra note 2.
8. Holland, supra note 7, at 1.
9. JCDA STUDY COMM., supra note 5, at 131.
10. See, e.g., Rehnquist's dissent in Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 870-74 (1988), which the New York Times has characterized as "troubling."
Editorial, JudicialEthics Under Review, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A28 [hereinafter
JudicialEthics].

11. Holland, supra note 7, at 1 (quoting Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Senate

Democrats (Jan. 2005)).

12. Laird v. Tatum, 404 U.S. 955 (1971) (mem.). Regarding Rehnquist's perjury and

lying, see FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note *, at 231-242.

13. JudicialEthics, supra note 10, at A28.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the committee that Rehnquist appointed
to evaluate how the federal judicial system is dealing with judicial
misbehavior has a "skewed composition" that "raise[d] concerns" about
how effectively it would do its job. 14 Four of the six members are judges
15 A fifth was Rehnquist's own
appointed by Republican presidents.
16
chief administrative assistant. The sixth is Breyer, whom the New York
Times has called "a curious choice," because his own confirmation had
been jeopardized by his failures to recuse himself when sitting in the
First Circuit.17 Moreover, Breyer has brushed aside the widespread
criticism of Scalia's denial of recusal in 18the Cheney case, and he has
called it "a very difficult ethical question."
The Breyer Committee's report, which was published in September
2006, is discussed in Part V of this article. Ironically, an issue that it
omits even to mention is the failures of Supreme Court Justices, like
Scalia and Breyer, to recuse themselves when required to do so.
III. BREYER'S FAILURES TO RECUSE HIMSELF IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT
When President Bill Clinton nominated Breyer in 1994 to serve on
9 My objection was
the Supreme Court, I opposed his confirmation.'
based upon a series of failures by Breyer to recuse himself when required
to do so while sitting as a judge in the First Circuit. The explanation of
my reasoning is in three parts: (A) Disqualification requirements under
the Due Process Clause; (B) Disqualification requirements under the
federal disqualification statute; and (C) Breyer's failures to recuse
himself in the First Circuit.

14. Id.
15. Holland, supra note 7, at 1.

16. Id.
17. JudicialEthics, supra note 10, at A28. For a discussion of those cases, see infra
Part III.C.
18. Gina Holland, Supreme Court Justice Says Tough Decisions Faced in Judges'
Ethics, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 9, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id= 1090180304699 (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). See Freedman, supra note 2.
19. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 325-35
(1994) (letter from Monroe H. Freedman, Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Ethics
to Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (July 13,
1994)) [hereinafter Hearing].

516
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A. DisqualificationRequirements under the Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause sets the minimum constitutional
requirement of judicial recusal. 20 That is, Congress or state legislatures
can make them more stringent, but not less stringent. 2 1 Even as a
minimum standard, due process requires not only impartiality in fact, but
also the appearance of impartiality on the part of judges.
Tumey v. Ohio22 was the first judicial disqualification case in the
Supreme Court. Tumey's unanimous decision was written by Chief
Justice Taft and it held that due process is violated if there is "a possible
temptation to the average.. . judge.., which might lead him not to hold
the balance nice, clear, and true.
,23 Tumey involved a misdemeanor
prosecution in which the judge received $12 as his share of the $100
penalty assessed against the defendant.24 In vacating the conviction for
violating due process, the Court held that unless the judge's interest is so
"remote, trifling, and insignificant," as to be de minimis, the
judge must
be disqualified.2 5 On that standard, the judge's receipt of $12 was held
to be sufficient to require his disqualification.
In determining what constitutes due process in disqualification cases,
the Tumey Court also held that it would consider the statutory and
common law of England prior to the adoption of the Constitution. 6 This
includes the fundamental principle, already established in the early
seventeenth century, that "no man may be a judge in his own case. ,,27
The meaning of "his own case" is not limited, literally, to the very same
case in which the judge is sitting, but also embraces cases in which the
judge is able to adopt a rule of law favorable to himself in a different
case.
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville,28 the Supreme Court vacated a
traffic conviction on due process grounds. In this case, the mayor, who
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986).
Id.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
Id. at 531-32.
Id. at 531 (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL

594 (7th ed. 1903)).
26. Id. at 523.

LIMITATIONS

27. Mark T. Coberly, Caesar's Wife Revisited - Judicial DisqualificationAfter the

1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1201, 1202-03 (1977) (quoting LORD

I COKE,

INSTITUTES *

141 a).

28. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).

COKE,
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acted as judge, received no share in the petitioner's fine of $100.
29
the village's revenue.
of
part
significant
a
were
fines
such
However,
Under state law, the defendant could have had a trial de novo before a
judge, but the Supreme Court held that due process entitled him to a
30
"neutral and detached judge in the first instance."
31
Another Supreme Court decision, In re Murchison, is of particular
importance because neither money nor an allegation of bias was
involved. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on due process
grounds because a state judge had held the defendant guilty of contempt
for conduct before a prior grand jury proceeding where the same judge
had presided.32 As noted by the dissent in Murchison, the judge had no
pecuniary interest in the case, nor was there even a contention that the
judge had become embroiled in the case or that he had been in any way
biased.33 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that "to perform its high
function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.'"34 Accordingly, even though the judge has no interest or bias in
fact, "no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome. 35
36
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie is another Supreme Court
decision involving recusal. In Lavoie, the Court found a due process
violation when Judge Embry, a judge who had participated in the case in
the Alabama Supreme Court, had himself been litigating two other cases
against insurance companies (neither of them Aetna) seeking punitive
3 7 However,
damages for a tortious bad faith refusal to pay a claim.
previous Alabama law had not clearly established such a tort. In Lavoie,
the Alabama Supreme Court recognized the tort, thereby establishing a
38
Thus, the
favorable precedent for Embry in his own litigation.
in
participation
Embry's
of
consisted
process
due
violation of
bad
tortious
of
issue
the
on
himself
establishing a precedent favorable to

29. Id. at 58.
30. Id. at 62.
31. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).

32. Id. at 139.
33. Id. at 140 (Reed, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 136 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).

35. Id.

36. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).

37. Id. at 817 .

38. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 813
(1986).
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faith, 39
which had made him, though indirectly, "a judge in his own
'
case."

In sum, the Due Process Clause requires judicial recusal whenever
there is a "possible temptation" to the average judge that "might" lead
him to be less than impartial, and whenever it can be said that the judge
is effectively acting indirectly as a judge in his own case.
B. The FederalJudicialDisqualificationStatute
In 1974, Congress amended the federal judicial disqualification
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455. This amendment substantially revised the
statute, making "massive changes" in the statutory law of judicial
disqualification.4 ° Specifically, subsection 455(a) is an "entirely new
'catchall' recusal provision, covering both 'interest or relationship'
and
'bias or prejudice' grounds, but requiring them all to be evaluated on an
objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice
but its appearance. 4 1
The catchall provision of subsection 455(a) is sparse in phrasing and
sweeping in scope. It says: "Any justice, judge or magistrate judge of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned., 42 As the Supreme Court
has recognized, "[q]uite simply and quite universally, recusal [is]
required whenever 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' ' 43
Further, in subsection 455(b), the statute requires disqualification
"also" in specified situations, the most important of which are:
actual
bias or prejudice; 44 "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;, 45 a financial interest, however small, in the
outcome of the proceedings; 4 6 or "any other interest" that could be
substantially affected by the outcome.47

39. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 475 U.S. at 824 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).

40. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546 (1994).

41. Id. at 548 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
43. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2000).

45. Id.
46. Id. §§ 455(b)(4), (d)(4). "Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a 'financial interest' in such securities unless the judge participates
in the management of the fund." Id. § 455(d)(4)(i).
47. Id. § 455(b)(4).
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The most important interpretation of section 455 is the Supreme
Court's decision in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., where
48
the Court gave effect to the plain meaning of subsection 455(a).
Liljeberg was a declaratory judgment suit that centered on a disputed
49
certificate of need from the State of Louisiana to build a new hospital.
Loyola University was not a party to the litigation but, because of a
contract between Loyola and Liljeberg, the university had a substantial
50
financial interest in Liljeberg's obtaining the certificate.
After a trial, Federal District Judge Robert Collins awarded the
certificate to Liljeberg. 51 Ten months later, Health Services Acquisition
Corp., which had been the losing party, learned that Judge Collins had
52
been a member of Loyola's board of trustees at the time of the trial.
to vacate the judgment and to retry
Accordingly, Health Services moved
53
judge.
impartial
an
before
the case
As a board member, Judge Collins had been present at meetings
54
However,
when Loyola's contract with Liljeberg had been discussed.
motion to
the
on
hearing
a
conducted
who
judge,
another federal district
forgotten
had
Collins
Judge
vacate the judgment, found as a fact that
about Loyola's interest in the matter during the trial, and the Supreme
55
Court accepted this finding in its discussion of subsection 455(a). This
did not answer the question, however, of whether a reasonable person
might nevertheless question whether Judge Collins had really forgotten
56
The
what he had known and might therefore question his impartiality.
problem, the Court noted, is that members of the public too often have
57
Congress
"suspicions and doubts" about the integrity of judges.

48. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).

49. Id. at 854.
50. Id. at 853.
51. Id. at 855.
52. Id. at 850.
53. Id. The motion was made under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (allowing a court to
relieve a party from a final judgment for "any . . . reason justifying relief"), because 28
U.S.C. § 455 does not prescribe any particular remedy for a judge's failure to recuse
himself when required to do so.
54. Liljeberg,486 U.S. at 851.
55. Id. at 864.
56. Id. at 860. The Court posited a reasonable person "knowing all the circumstances"
standard (which included Judge Collins' denial of any recollection of Loyola's interest in
the case). Id. at 861. See also Sao Paulo v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 229 (2002).
57. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
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enacted subsection 455(a) to eliminate such suspicions and doubts and to
avoid "the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.9 58
In addition, the district court made a finding of fact that eight days
after he entered judgment in the case, Judge Collins received actual
knowledge of Loyola's financial interest in the award of the certificate of
need. 59 The Supreme Court held that this constituted a separate violation
of subsection 455(b)(4), which requires disqualification if a judge
"knows that he .. .as a fiduciary,
subject matter in controversy or . .

. .
.

. has a financial interest in the
any other interest that could be

substantially affected by the outcome. 60 (If Judge Collins had revealed
the facts upon receiving knowledge of Loyola's interest, Health Services
could have filed a motion for a new trial within the ten day period

allowed for such motions.)

61

The holding in Liljeberg makes it clear that both subsection 455(a)
and subsection 445(b) can be relevant in the same case; that is, although
subsections 455(a) and 455(b) overlap considerably, they are
complementary. 62 In Liljeberg there was a violation of subsection 455(a)
during the trial because, despite the finding that the judge had forgotten
about Loyola's interest, a reasonable person might nevertheless question
whether the judge had truly forgotten about it. 63 In addition, there was a
violation of subsection 455(b)(4) because the judge, after judgment, had
received knowledge of the ground for disqualification through a letter
from Loyola - which implicates a distinct requirement of subsection
64
455(b)(4) - and had done nothing about it.
This complementary
application of the two subsections is consistent, of course, with the
introductory language of subsection 455(b): "He shall also disqualify
himself in the following circumstances ... ,65
Moreover, Liljeberg shows that subsection 455(a) can apply even in
a case in which subsection 455(b)(4) is relevant but not fulfilled. That is,
subsection 455(b)(4) requires recusal unless the judge "knows" of his
financial interest in the case. Thus, Judge Collins, who had made no
connection between the Liljeberg case and Loyola's financial interest,
58. Id. at 865.
59. Id. at 851.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
Id. at 851,869.
Id. at 859-60.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 867.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000).

2005]

JudicialImpartiality

was not required to recuse himself under subsection 455(b)(4) during the
trial (which was prior to his "knowing" in fact through the letter from
Loyola). Nevertheless, Collins had been required to disqualify himself at
the outset of the case under subsection 455(a), because a reasonable
person might have questioned whether he had failed to recall Loyola's
interest at that time.
C. Breyer's Failuresto Recuse Himself in the First Circuit
In 1985, Judge Breyer was a member, or Name, in the Lloyd's of
66
London Merrett Syndicate 418, insuring asbestos and pollution losses.
Breyer's exposure to liability through that syndicate was on-going at the
time of his confirmation hearings in 1994. As of 1993, the total losses on
the Merrett account were $245.6 million.67 The fortunes of other Names
had been wiped out with Lloyd's liabilities totaling nearly $12 billion.68
For years, therefore, the Names had been understandably anxious about
additional ruinous losses.
The New York Times characterized Breyer's membership in Lloyd's
as "[a] [t]ricky [i]nvestment., 69 Athough Breyer assured the Senate
Judiciary Committee that he would get out of his membership as soon as
possible, it appeared to be a questionable pledge. 70 He himself had
testified that he had been trying to extricate himself for years. Also,
according to Richard Rosenblatt, who headed a group of hundreds of
American Names who were "afraid of being wiped out," it would cost
Breyer more than $1 million to reinsure himself against his personal
share of his syndicate's losses. 71 Even then, he would have remained
liable if his insurer had been unable to pay.72
In addition to his Lloyd's insurance liability, Breyer and his wife
held investments of over $250,000 in chemical and pharmaceutical
companies. Moody's Investors Services said at the time that these were

66. The information relating to Breyer's involvement in Merrett Syndicate 418 was
first revealed publicly in an article in Newsday on June 24, 1994. Timothy M. Phelps &
Michael Weber, Supreme Court Conflict?, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1994.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: The Hearing; Taking Initiative, Nominee
Defends Conduct As Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at A1, A 16.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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"among the highest risks for Superfund liability., 73 Moreover, Breyer
also held significant long-term investments in several liability insurance
carriers that, according to the FinancialTimes, had been "haunted by the
prospect of big claims for environmental liability," especially Superfund
liability. 74 In 1994, Breyer's biggest single U.S. investment was
American International Group. 75 According to Best's Review, an
industry trade magazine and investment adviser, AIG was then
"depending on ...judicial trends" on Superfund for its future financial
health.7 6
The judge also owned stock in General Re Corporation. That
company's 1994 annual report warned investors that their future earnings
could be affected by "new theories of liability and new contract
interpretations" by judges on Superfund.77
Bearing in mind the constitutional and statutory requirements of
recusal, as well as Breyer's heavy financial interest in Superfund
liability, consider United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc.78 Two years after
the Supreme Court explained the broad scope of subsection 455(a) in
Liljeberg, Breyer failed to disqualify himself from Ottati & Goss, even
though the case involved the Environmental Protection Agency's powers
to impose Superfund liability on polluters like those the judge knew he
was insuring and whose stock he owned in substantial amounts.
Ottati & Goss arose under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (known as
"CERCLA," or the "Superfund Act"). 79 The case involved an effort by
the EPA to require several companies to clean up thirty-four acres of
hazardous waste sites and to reimburse the government for clean up that
the agency had already undertaken. Lower court decisions were split on
whether a trial court could review such an EPA decision de novo, or
whether the EPA's decision was only subject to judicial revision if its
decision were found to have been an arbitrary and capricious abuse of its
powers. 80
73. I am relying here on the reporting and analysis of Bruce Shapiro in Bruce Shapiro,
Breyer Conflicts. (Supreme Court Nominee Stephen G. Breyer), THE NATION, July 18,
1994, at 76.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
79. Id. at 431. The Superfund Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (2000).
80. Ottati& Goss, 900 F.2d at 432.
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Breyer expressly recognized that his decision would have important
precedential effect, with "implications for other [Superfund clean-up]
cases as well as this one, 8 ' and with "implications beyond the confines
of this case." 82 Also, for all he knew, Breyer might have been insuring
83
the company before him on appeal, or others like it in future cases.
Like Judge Embry in Lavoie, therefore, Breyer was in the position of
effectively setting an important precedent that could affect the financial
outcome in his own case or cases.84 Moreover, in view of Breyer's
enormous potential liability, deciding Ottati & Goss would surely present
"a possible temptation to the average.., judge.., which might lead him
not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true.
,85
Turning from the Due Process Clause to the disqualification statute,
it seems clear also that Breyer's impartiality "might reasonably be
questioned" 86 in Ottati & Goss, causing "suspicions and doubts" about
the integrity of judges. 87 Furthermore, it would appear to be precisely
the kind of situation Congress sought to avoid in subsection 455(a).88
How a judge ultimately decides a case has no effect on whether he
had a duty to disqualify himself at the outset. In fact, however, Breyer's
decision in Ottati & Goss weakened the power of the EPA to impose
liability on polluters, and his opinion was indeed influential, causing the
EPA to change its own regulations.8 9
90
Similarly, Judge Breyer participated in Reardon v. United States,
where the First Circuit declared part of the Superfund Act
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Breyer did not know the specic companies for whose Superfund losses he was
responsible. For that reason, he was also in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455(c), which
imposed upon him an absolute obligation to "inform himself about his personal ...
financial interest." See Hearing,supra note 19, at 329.
84. It is true that Embry's litigation was pending when he decided Lavoie, while
Breyer's liability was impending. However, Embry's ultimate recovery of $30,000 was
paltry as compared with Breyer's very real prospect of being bankrupted by his
Superfund liability as a Lloyd's Name.
85. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
87. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988).
88. In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court relied primarily upon 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) while
recognizing that subsection 455(b)(4) also applied. Breyer was "also" required to
disqualify himself if he had "any ... interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). Breyer's financial wipe-out interest
in Superfund liability, through Merrett Syndicate 418, qualifies as such an interest.
89. United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429, 445 (1st Cir. 1990).
90. Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991).
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unconstitutional. In Reardon, the EPA had removed tons of contaminated
soil and placed a lien on the property to secure payment of its costs. 91
The loss represented by that lien is the same kind of loss that Judge
Breyer was liable to reimburse as an insurer. The effect of the decision,
holding that the EPA did not have the power to impose the lien, made 92
it
more difficult for the EPA expeditiously to obtain payment of its costs.

Ultimately, therefore, Breyer participated in a case in violation of both
the Constitution and the federal disqualification statute.
In response to my letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee opposing
Breyer's confirmation as Associate Justice, Professor Stephen Gillers
wrote a letter on behalf of Breyer. 93 In the course of that letter, Gillers
focused principally on subsection 455(b)(4) (which had not been my
principal reliance). 94 Subsection 455(b)(4), again, requires recusal when
a judge knows that he has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or "any other interest
that could be substantially affected by
95
proceeding.,
the
of
outcome
the
In his discussion of that section, Gillers misstated the text of the
statute in order to appear to refute my position. 96 Freedman, he said, was
wrong to maintain that Breyer should have recused himself from Ottati
& Goss97 on the ground that the case "involved the [EPA's] powers to
impose liability on polluters like those the Judge knew he was
insuring." 98 "This is just wrong," Gillers asserted, "It is not the
standard." 99
The reason I was wrong, and misstated the standard, according to
Gillers, was that "Professor Freedman cannot say with any degree of
confidence that the decision [written by Breyer] would have [had] a
direct and substantial effect on the judge's interests." 10 0 That was, of
course, true. But note the italicized words, which are not the language of
the text of subsection 455(b)(4). In fact, where Gillers substitutes the
91. Id. at 1511.
92. Id. at 1522-23.
93. Hearing,supra note 19, at 33644 (letter from Stephen Gillers, Professor of Law,
New York University, to Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate (July 15, 1994)).
94. Id.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
96. Hearing,supra note 19, at 337-42.
97. Id. at 340.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 340-41 (emphasis added).
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word "would," the Congress actually used "could;" and where Gillers
interpolates the words "direct and" before "substantial effect," Congress
used only "substantial."' 01
The difference is, of course, considerable, 10 2 because what I was
indeed able to say with confidence was that Breyer's decision "could"
have had a "substantial" effect on his financial interests (a matter that
was beyond dispute in view of Breyer's exposure as a Name in Lloyd's
and his heavy holdings in chemical and pharmaceutical companies).
In addition, when Gillers turned to subsection 455(a), he gave a
shrunken rendering of the language that the Supreme Court had so
broadly interpreted in Liljeberg.10 3 As we have seen, the Court in
Lijeberg held that "the very purpose of [section] 455(a) is to promote
confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of
impropriety whenever possible."10 4 That is the effect of the statutory text
referring to whether the judge's impartiality "might reasonably be
questioned."'10 5 Similarly, the Due Process Clause requires recusal if
there is a "possible temptation" that "might" lead a judge to be less than
impartial. 106
However, Gillers ignored the Supreme Court's broad language in
Liljeberg, relying instead upon Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting
Services., Inc., ° 7 an appellate court case decided two years before
Liljeberg. That enabled Gillers to rewrite the broad statutory text into a
requirement that an "objective, disinterested observer... would entertain
significant doubt that justice would be done."' 1 8 By doing so, Gillers
was seemingly able to justify Breyer's failures to recuse himself in the
Superfund cases.

101. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
102. For the important distinction between "could" and "would," see FREEDMAN &
SMITH, supra note *, at § 9.06 ("What a Reasonable Person 'Might,' 'Could,' and

'Would' Do").
103. Hearing,supra note 19, at 339-40.
104. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

106. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532.
107. Hearing,supra note 19, at 343; Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Servs., Inc.,
782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986).
108. Hearing, supra note 19, at 343 (quoting Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 715). For
that matter, though, I do entertain a significant doubt that a judge can be completely
objective, no matter how hard he might try, when he has as much at stake in the cases as
Breyer had.
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By contrast, however, in a recent op-ed article, Gillers criticized then
District of Columbia Circuit Judge John Roberts, Jr., for participating in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld' 0 9 (a terrorism case), but made no reference to
Union Carbide or to any other restrictive appellate decision on
recusal." 0 Instead, Gillers quoted Liljeberg for the holding that "the
very purpose of [subsection 455(a)] is to promote confidence in the
judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever
possible."'''
The importance of Gillers' consistent support of Breyer's failures to
recuse himself will become apparent shortly.
IV. BREYER'S PUZZLING AND TROUBLING RECUSAL POLICY ON THE
SUPREME COURT
This section is in two parts: (A) Breyer's initial recusal policy on the
Court, and (B) Breyer's recent recusal policy on the Court.
A. Breyer's InitialRecusal Policy on the Court
Not long after Justice Breyer had become a member of the United
States Supreme Court, I received a telephone call from a lawyer who
identified himself as a good friend of Justice Breyer. He had called to
call my attention, first, to two recent Supreme Court cases in which
Breyer had recused himself and to inform me that Breyer had, at
considerable expense, reinsured his potential liability as a Lloyd's
Name. 1 2 Moreover, some of the Supreme Court cases in which Breyer
had recused himself were significantly less serious cases for recusal than
some of those on which Breyer had chosen to sit when he was a judge in
the First Circuit. l13

109. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33
(D.D.C. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
110. Stephen Gillers, David J. Luban, & Steven Lubet, Improper Advances: Talking
Dream Jobs with the Judge out of Court, SLATE, Aug. 17, 2005, http://slate.com/id/
2124603/?navltap3 (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
111. Id.
112. See also Tony Mauro, Wave of Recusals Marks Breyer's Debut, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1994, at 8; Neil A. Lewis, Justice Breyer Severs Ties to the Lloyd's Syndicate,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A24 (Breyer had reinsured himself "at a hefty price").
113. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 916
(1994) (denying cert.).
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In short, either on his own or in response to private pressure from
one or more members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Breyer had
adopted a policy consistent with the criticisms in my letter to the
committee. Accordingly, I wrote a letter to the New York Times, where I
had also criticized Breyer, saying that I had been wrong in predicting that
Breyer would disregard his ethical obligations as a member of the
Supreme Court. "

4

B. Breyer's Recent Recusal Policy on the Court
Unfortunately, in recent cases, Justice Breyer seems to be reverting
to his pre-Supreme Court policy with regard to recusal.
1. The PhRMA Case
For example, in 2003 the Supreme Court decided Pharmaceutical
115 The
Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh ("PhRMA").
case involved an action by an association of pharmaceutical companies
to keep their profits up by challenging state efforts to reduce the cost of
prescription drugs to consumers. 1 16 The immediate question before the
Court was whether a district court judge had properly granted a
17
preliminary injunction against one such plan in Maine."
According to his financial disclosure statements at the time, Breyer
continued to hold stock in three major pharmaceutical companies who
were suing through the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
18
America- Merke & Co., Genzyme Corp., and Schering-Plough Corp."
Again, the decision regarding recusal was to be made at the outset of the
case, yet Breyer did not recuse himself.
Breyer did concur with the Court in vacating the preliminary
judgment on the ground that it had been issued on an incorrect standard,
119
and he concurred in remanding the case for further proceedings.
However, Breyer, writing alone, used his opinion to make, in effect, a

114. Monroe H. Freedman, Letter to the Editor, Justice Breyer Takes Ethics Seriously,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,1994, at A26.

115.
116.
117.
118.
2002,
119.

Pharm. Research & Mfrs. ofAm. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
Id. at 644.
Id.
Tony Mauro, Maine Case: Prescriptionfor Recusal?, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30,
at 3.
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 538 U.S. at 670, 674.
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tactical suggestion to PhRMA about how a preliminary injunction could
be justified on remand. 2 0 Breyer expressed the view that a decision by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services should be given particular
weight by the district court. 12 1 (The Secretary, of course, might have
been persuaded to be more amenable to PhRMA's position than the
district court judge had been.) Breyer also urged the district court to
122
defer to any decision by the Secretary.
When the PhRMA case first came before the Supreme Court, a
23
reporter raised the question of whether Breyer should recuse himself.1
Again, Professor Gillers came to Breyer's defense, opining somewhat
delphically that because the named party was an association of
pharmaceutical companies (including those in which Breyer was an
investor), "[i]t's a more fluid standard ....

You have to follow the

24
potential consequences of the case on the investment." 1

120. Id. at 671.
121. Id. at 672.
122. Breyer explained:
By vacating the injunction, we shall also help ensure that the District
Court takes account of the Secretary's views in further proceedings
that may involve a renewed motion for a preliminary injunction. It is
important that the District Court do so ....

In addition, the legal doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" permits a
court itself to "refer" a question to the Secretary. That doctrine seeks
to produce better informed and uniform legal rulings by allowing
courts to take advantage of an agency's specialized knowledge,
expertise, and central position with a regulatory regime ....

[I]n my view, even if [the state] should choose not to obtain the
Secretary's views on its own, the desirability of the District Court's
having those views to consider.., is relevant to the "public interest"
determination that often factors into whether a preliminary injunction
should issue ....
Id. at 672-74.
123. Mauro, supra note 118.
124. Id.
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2. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Cases - Breyer's "Bias" and His
"Personal Triumph"
In 2004, the following year, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two
cases attacking the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 125 Previously, when Justice Breyer had been sitting in the
First Circuit, he had announced in United States v. Wright 126 that he
would "automatically" recuse himself from any case that involved" a
"serious legal challenge to the Guidelines themselves." 127 This was
consistent with a position that had been taken by the Department of
Justice, which had maintained that Breyer should only recuse himself in
a case that would "jeopardize the continued existence of the Guidelines
system." 128
The particular aspect of Breyer's involvement with the Guidelines
that he referred to in Wright was that Breyer was then in the last year of
his four years as a member on the Sentencing Guidelines Commission. 129
This was considered enough by both Breyer and the DOJ to justify his
automatic recusal in a challenge to the validity of the Guidelines, even
though the Supreme Court had held that service on the Commission was
"an essentially neutral endeavor."'' 30 In fact, simply being a member of
the Commission was the least significant part of Breyer's history of
involvement with the Guidelines system.
Of far more importance to Breyer's recusal is the fact that he was
"the primary architect of the federal sentencing guidelines" when he
served as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 131 Indeed,
125. The cases are reported together as United States v. Booker and United States v.
Fanfan, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
126. United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 447. Both Breyer and the Department of Justice distinguished the case in
which Breyer would be called upon to interpret the Guidelines. This same distinction is
adopted in FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note *, at 254-55.
128. Wright, 873 F.2d at 437.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 446 (Breyer, J., writing separately); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
407 (1989).
131. Naftali Bendavid, Judicial Traitor or Consensus Builder? Breyer's Role as
Sentencing Pioneer Still Rankles, LEGAL TIMES, May 16, 1994, at 7 (relying in part on
Professor Albert Alschuler). See also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Changes Use of
Sentencing Guides, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al, A29 (Breyer "played a leading role
in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act"); Patrick Strawbridge, Breyer Still Backs
Sentencing Guides, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD Co., Nov. 19, 1998, at 22 ("Breyer spent
years helping to build sentencing guidelines for federal judges").
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Breyer expressly recognized, in a formal law school address in 1998, the
"bias" that may result from "my own participation in the creation of the
Guidelines." 132 In the same address, Breyer expressed the view that the
guidelines system should not be abandoned. 133
Also of more importance than Breyer's mere service on the
Commission, is his significant achievement as a Commission member of
salvaging the entire Guidelines project at the beginning of his tenure on
the Commission. As the new Commission struggled to establish
' 34
workable guidelines, "the panel erupted into bitter disputes."'
Meanwhile, federal judges were "furious" with the guideline scheme
ultimately creating "fierce opposition" from the
being proposed,
35
1
judiciary.
With the deadline approaching, "Breyer stepped in and single' 36
handedly wrote the concept of the [G]uidelines we now have."'
According to a former sentencing commission staffer, Breyer was "a
wonderful consensus-builder, a brilliant analyst." 37 "He's responsible
for the conceptual framework of the [G]uidelines and for striking the key
compromises." 138

To sum up, then, the mere fact of Breyer's membership on the
Commission is the least significant aspect of his role regarding the
Guidelines. He was the "primary architect" of the Guidelines; he saved
the Guidelines at the outset of the commission's existence when they
were in jeopardy; he "single-handedly wrote the concept of the
[G]uidelines we now have,"' 1 39 and is "responsible for the conceptual
framework of the [G]uidelines."' 140 Finally, he has, in a formal public
context, acknowledged "bias" on his part that might result from his
intensive and crucial involvement in the project.
Breyer's recusal from the Supreme Court cases challenging the
constitutional validity of his project would therefore seem to have been
inevitable. Apparently, in wanting to ensure his key role as preserver of
132. Justice Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT'G
REP. 180, 1999 WL 730985, at *11 (1999).
133. Id. See also Strawbridge, supra note 131, at 22.
134. Bendavid, supra note 131, at 7.
135. Id.

136.
Forest
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. (quoting Professor Ronald Wright, who specializes in sentencing at Wake
University).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2005]

JudicialImpartiality

his creation, however, Breyer sought an opinion that would justify his
participation in the case, and turned, not surprisingly, to Professor
Gillers.
In response, Gillers wrote Breyer a brief, superficial opinion letter
containing virtually no legal analysis and making no reference 141
to
Liljeberg or to any other Supreme Court decision dealing with recusal.
However, Gillers was able to conclude that there is "no reason" for
Breyer to follow the "cautious approach" he had announced in his Wright
opinion in 1989. Indeed, Gillers even found no need to "invite the
litigants to address your qualification to sit,' ' 142 because there is no
"reasonable basis to question your impartiality on the issue of the
' 143
validity of the Guidelines."
The reference to "inviting the litigants to address [the Justice's]
qualification to sit,, 14 4 was to subsection 455(e), which allows a judge to
avoid disqualification if he can obtain a waiver from the parties,
"preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification." 145 Apparently, neither Breyer nor Gillers trusted the
parties to grant such a waiver if provided with full disclosure of the
circumstances.
Finally, Gillers assured the Justice, "Nor is there any other basis to
question your authority to sit in such a case by virtue of your prior
service." 146 The prior service mentioned in the letter was that Breyer had
been a member of the Sentencing Commission. 147 Subsequently,
however, Gillers took a contrary position in a less compelling case, when
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., chose a law clerk who had worked for Time
Warner and for the government. The clerk, Gillers opined, "cannot work
for the justice on any cases that come before the court if he worked on
those matters at Time Warner or the government." 148 As Gillers
correctly explained with regard to149the clerk, "You don't want him to
judge the quality of his own work."'
141. Letter from Stephen Gillers, Professor of Law, to Justice Stephen Breyer (July 2,
2004) [hereinafter Gillers Letter] (on file with author).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).

146. Gillers Letter, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. Adam Liptak, New Clerkfor Alito Has a Long Paper Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,

2006, at W14.
149. Id.
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Moreover, Giller's letter seriously understated Breyer's role in
creating and preserving the Guidelines. Left unmentioned, and obscured
by the opaque reference to "[no] other basis" 150 for recusal, were
Breyer's role as the "primary architect"' 51 of the Guidelines, Breyer's
success in saving the Guidelines when they were in jeopardy,' 52 Breyer's
achievement in "single-handedly [writing] the concept of the
[G]uidelines we now have,, 1 53 Breyer's responsibility for "the
conceptual framework of the [G]uidelines,"'' 54 and Breyer's own
acknowledgment of the "bias" on his part that 55might result from that
intensive and crucial involvement in the project. 1
Fortified by Gillers' short and inadequate letter, Justice Breyer not
only sat on the Guidelines cases, but he cast the decisive vote in a 5-4
split, and he further wrote the opinion that preserved the Guidelines from
oblivion. 56 Again, the decision regarding recusal should be made at the
outset, and the judge's ultimate decision is not material. However, the
case for Breyer's recusal is pithily expressed in the report of the decision
by Linda Greenhouse in the New York Times.' 57 "The Sentencing
Commission remains intact and the guidelines are still on the books, with
58
the presumption that most judges will follow them most of the time." 1
Therefore, Greenhouse concluded, the decision was something of a
"personal triumph" for Justice Breyer, who had once again saved his
creation from oblivion. 5 9
V. THE BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT

Chief Justice Rehnquist's mandate to the Breyer Committee is brief
and explicit. 160 The committee is to "evaluate how the federal judicial
system is dealing with misbehavior and disability."' 61 Moreover,

150. Id.
151. Bendavid, supra note 131.
152. Id.

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Breyer, supra note 132, at * 11.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
Greenhouse, supra note 131, at A29.
Id.
Id.
See JCDA STUDY COMM., supra note 5, at app. A at 131.
Id.
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Rehnquist anticipated that this study would be the first "comprehensive"
look into the judicial discipline system since 1991.162
Understandably, a principal concern of the committee was with cases
of judicial impropriety that have had high visibility. The committee
noted that high-visibility cases are of special importance because "the
public is particularly likely to form' 163
a view of the judiciary's handling of
all cases on the basis of these few."
As noted at the outset of this article, the appointment of the
committee resulted, in substantial part, from the intense criticisms caused
by the failures of Supreme Court Justices to recuse themselves when
required to do so. Those cases, such as Justice Scalia's denial of recusal
in the Cheney case, are the highest visibility cases of all. Indeed, it is
doubtful that many members of the public have been at all as aware of
recusal failures by lower court judges.
Thus, the Breyer Committee had a mandate to take a comprehensive
look at the problem of judicial misconduct, and the committee itself
recognized the critical importance to that mandate of high-visibility
cases. Nevertheless, the committee chose to ignore the highest-visibility
cases of all, in which Supreme Court justices have, with impunity,
ignored their statutory and constitutional obligations to recuse
themselves.
The way the committee accomplished that was to announce at the
outset of its report, without giving any reason, that the task before it was
not a comprehensive one, but "a narrow one."' 164 The committee also
asserted that it had not been asked to "rewrite" the Judicial Conduct and
Disabilities Act. 165 That, of course, is accurate. However, the Chief
Justice had directed the committee to "evaluate" how the federal judicial
system as a whole was dealing with judicial misbehavior.166 Further, he
had directed the committee to determine whether there are "any real
problems."' 167 Moreover, the Chief Justice had contemplated a
"comprehensive" investigation. 168 Most important, although the
committee had not been asked to "rewrite" the relevant legislation, the
committee did recognize that it was expected to "evaluate how the
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.
Id.
See id. at app. A at 131.
Id.
Id.
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federal judicial system is dealing with judicial misbehavior" and to make
69
appropriate recommendations to respond to congressional criticisms.1
in fact, devote an entire concluding
Accordingly, the committee 1 7did,
0
Recommendations.
to
chapter
How, then, did the Breyer Committee manage to ignore the most
serious problem of all? The answer lies in the fact that the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act applies to all federal judges except members
of the Supreme Court. 171 Thus, by declining to "rewrite" that statute, the
committee tried to give the impression that it was also beyond its
mandate even to recommend that new legislation might be written by
to deal with judicial misconduct by members of the Supreme
Congress
2
17

Court.

Accordingly, the Breyer Committee labored for over two years,
produced a hefty report, and ignored completely any mention of the
principal problem that had given rise to the committee's existence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supreme Court Justices have been ignoring the mandates of both the
Due Process Clause and the federal disqualification statute, repeatedly
refusing to recuse themselves in cases in which their impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. In response to widespread criticism of these
recusal failures, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist established the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee. Unfortunately,
Rehnquist appointed Justice Stephen Breyer to chair the committee.
Breyer was a particularly inappropriate choice to head up such a
committee because, both in the First Circuit and in recent cases in the
Supreme Court, he has conspicuously disregarded his own recusal
obligations. In addition, he has brushed aside criticisms of Justice
Scalia's denial of a recusal motion in the Cheney case, which was a
particular focus of the criticisms of judicial misconduct that led to the
establishment of the committee.
Predictably, therefore, the Breyer Committee's report and
recommendations have ignored completely the most highly visible and
important cases of judicial misconduct - those involving Breyer himself

169. Id.
170. Id. at 107-125.

171. 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1).
172. How that might best be done will be the subject of a subsequent article.
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and his colleagues on the Supreme Court of the United States.
Accordingly, the future of judicial impartiality on the Supreme Court
looks bleaker than ever.

